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Following the Fukushima accident and its extended station blackout, attention was
brought to the importance of the spent fuel pools' (SFPs) behavior in case of a prolonged
loss of the cooling system. Since then, many analytical works have been performed to
estimate the timing of hypothetical fuel uncovery for various SFP types. Experimentally,
however, little was done to investigate issues related to the formation of a flammable gas
mixture, distribution, and stratification in the SFP building itself and to some extent assess
the capability for the code to correctly predict it.
This paper presents the main outcomes of the Experiments on Spent Fuel Pool (ESFP)
project carried out under the auspices of Swissnuclear (Framework 2012e2013) in the
PANDA facility at the Paul Scherrer Institut in Switzerland. It consists of an experimental
investigation focused on hydrogen concentration build-up into a SFP building during a
predefined scaled scenario for different venting positions. Tests follow a two-phase sce-
nario. Initially steam is released to mimic the boiling of the pool followed by a helium/
steam mixture release to simulate the deterioration of the oxidizing spent fuel. Results
shows that while the SFP building would mainly be inerted by the presence of a high
concentration of steam, the volume located below the level of the pool in adjacent rooms
would maintain a high air content. The interface of the two-gas mixture presents the
highest risk of flammability. Additionally, it was observed that the gas mixture could
become stagnant leading locally to high hydrogen concentration while steam condenses.
Overall, the experiments provide relevant information for the potentially hazardous gas
distribution formed in the SFP building and hints on accident management and on even-
tual retrofitting measures to be implemented in the SFP building.
Copyright © 2016, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).(G. Mignot).
sevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1.1. Background
The 2011 Fukushima accident has recalled attention to the
importance of the behavior of spent fuel pools (SFP) in case of
a loss of the cooling systemassociatedwith a station blackout.
Spent fuel assemblies are commonly stored in pools located in
buildings not designed to withstand over-pressure. In cases
when the pool cooling capability is lost or heavily degraded for
very long time, e.g., in a postulated long lasting station
blackout with damage of the SFP building due to external
events, the steam and later on the hydrogen release cannot be
confined within the SFP building [1e3].
To avoid that combustible air/hydrogen mixtures, leading
to deflagration and/or detonation that would form in the
building, a possibility would be to implement mitigation de-
vices, e.g., passive autocatalytic recombiners/igniters aiming
at reducing the hydrogen concentration, or another possibility
would be to dilute (inerting) hydrogen with steam and to vent
the resulting mixture outside the SFP building. The physical
phenomena associated with hydrogen distribution is complex
and involves multi-phase, multi-components mixing and
stratification, multi-compartment transport induced by den-
sity or pressure differences, condensation induced by the
proximity of a cold wall or the activation of safety system, re-
evaporation phenomena, etc. The usual approach in safety
analysis is to identify, through simulations using advanced
three-dimensional computational tools (e.g., GOTHIC,
FLUENT, GASFLOW, etc.) the regions/compartments where
combustible mixtures may form and elaborate a mitigation
strategy accordingly. The validation of such computational
tools against a suitable experimental database (e.g., in large-
scale, multi-compartment facilities with conceptual flow
diagram-grade instrumentation) is a continuous process un-
dertaken by the scientific community and it is necessary to
identify the computational needs (e.g., physical modeling,
mesh features, time steps, etc.) to analyze similar scenarios in
nuclear power plants.
At the expert meeting held by the International Atomic
Energy Agency in Vienna [4], it was underlined that analysis of
severe accidents related to SFPs had not been carried out as
much as in other areas. The need for research and develop-
ment on hydrogen flammability patterns to address the
implementation of mitigation measures were identified and
recommendations on expanding the existing projects on ac-
cident prevention and mitigation were given. Also, it was
pointed out that that “continued detailed investigations of the
accident sequence, including assessment of computer code
applicability to observed severe accident phenomena” should
be undertaken. Since then, numerous analyses have been
carried out for specific plant designs involving various code
comparisons (e.g., MELCOR, RELAP5, ATHLET CD, ASTEC, etc.)
[5e7].
In the meantime, the OECD/NEA (Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy
Agency) SFP project by Sandia National Laboratory in the USA
(2011e2013) was conducted to provide experimental datarelevant for hydraulic and ignition phenomena of prototypical
water reactor fuel assemblies. This project consisted of two
phases: (1) the first phase focusing on axial heating and burn
propagation; (2) the second phase addressing radial heating
and burn propagation including the effects of fuel rod
ballooning. The Paul Scherrer Institut was part of the project
and the input deck used for MELCOR code in the SFP project
was the base for the scoping calculation conducted to simu-
late an accident scenario in the SFP building [7].
1.2. Objectives and approach
The Swissnuclear Experiments on SFP (ESFP) project focused
on the late phase of a postulated severe accident, involving
the partial uncovery of the fuel assembly, hydrogen genera-
tion by fuel-cladding metalewater reaction, and release of
hydrogen and steam to the gas space of the SFP building and
from there to the environment.
The main objective of the PANDA ESFP project is to inves-
tigate hydrogen concentration build-up into the SFP building
for different venting positions. Subsequently, the experiments
should provide relevant information for severe accident
management concerning the need of implementing a miti-
gation system in the SFP building itself.
A wide variety of SFPs exist, and it was not the objective of
the project to focus on the SFP of a particular nuclear power
plant. Therefore the PANDA tests are defined in a general
way, i.e., the results do not apply to any specific SFP building.
Nevertheless, the test conditions and the associated phe-
nomenology are representative of the phenomenology in the
SFP building gas space during a postulated severe accident.
Moreover, the experimental database which was obtained is
suitable for the assessment and validation of advanced
computational tools to analyze hydrogen concentration
build-up in the SFP building under various postulated
conditions.2. Test scenario and parameters
2.1. Preliminary analysis with MELCOR
Calculations using the advanced Lumped Parameter
computational tool MELCOR were carried out at Paul
Scherrer Institut within the ESFP project to obtain repre-
sentative initial and boundary conditions for the experi-
ments [7]. As reference, the geometry of a SFP of a typical
Generation II pressurized water reactor (~400 MW) was
considered. For the generic SFP building a total volume of
about 5,700 m3 was considered. The SFPs consisting of three
pools (Storage Pool-A and B and the Transfer Pool-C; Fig. 1)
have been analyzed with MELCOR. Calculations have been
made for four different configurations, varying the pool
water level, the fuel activity, and the number of fuel ele-
ments. Combining together these last two parameters the
integral heat loads of 0.5 MW and 4.7 MW were considered
in the MELCOR analysis. The parameters of the calculation
are presented in Table 1.
Fig. 1 e Schema of spent fuel pools arrangement in the
studied case scenario in MELCOR.
Fig. 2 e Schema representing the conceptual configuration
of a generic spent fuel pool building with the PANDA
vessels. IP, interconnecting pipe.
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gral heat load (4.7 MW), the air initially present in the building
would be completely replaced by the steam generated (at a
high rate) by the pool boiling off before degradation of the fuel.
For this reason, the possibility of the formation of a defla-
grating mixture inside the building was ruled out. Instead, for
the case with a lower integral heat load (0.5 MW), steam
generation rate would be lower. Therefore air would not be
completely purged from the building at the time hydrogen is
generated. In such cases, the resulting gas mixture may reach
the deflagration limit. The results obtained by the simulation
of the SFP building, have been used to define the scenario of
the PANDA tests.2.2. Definition of the test scenario
Fig. 2 presents on the left, schematically, a cross section of the
SFP building and on the right the schema of PANDA vessels.
During normal conditions, about half of the building is filled
with water, while in the postulated accident scenarios, the
water level decreases and part of the fuel is uncovered. The
steam and hydrogen generated then fills almost the entire
building volume and flows to the adjacent rooms through the
doors which are located at almost half the elevation of theTable 1 e Case parameters used in the MELCOR calculations.
Case Configuration Water level (m)
1 Pool B only 3.5
2 Pool C isolated from A and B 9.87
3 Pool C connected to A and B 9.87
4 Pool C empty 0
FE, fuel elements.building. In PANDA, Vessel 1 is used to represent the SFP
building and the interconnecting pipe (IP) which allows flow to
Vessel 2 represents the opening “door” to the adjacent rooms
of the SFP building.
It is assumed in the current scenario that no active vent-
ing of the SFP building occurs. The scenario consists of two
phases. In Phase 1, steam is injected at 60 g/s until the wall
temperature reaches 85C in Vessel 1. In Phase 2, helium was
added at a rate of 2 g/s to the steam injection (still at 60 g/s).
These flow rates were obtained from scaling down the MEL-
COR results based on the volume of the facility (90 m3, i.e.,
only Vessel 1) and the volume of the generic SFP building
(5,700 m3). From the preliminary MELCOR analysis, the total
hydrogen and steammass released in the SFP building during
the oxidation phase was estimated to be 500 kg and 25,000 kg,
respectively. Assuming the 1/63 ratio between the volumes of
the SFP building and the PANDA vessel, and taking into
consideration the molar mass difference between hydrogen
and helium, the total mass of helium and steam to inject
were calculated to 15.8 kg and 395 kg, respectively. The
average magnitude of the hydrogen release was of about 1 g/s
in Case 1 of the MELCOR analysis, which corresponds to
about 2 g/s of helium in the experiment. Overall, the injection
of helium lasted about 2 hours to reach the total amount
desired. The total amount of steam calculated above is to be
injected in this same time laps. It should be noted that the
release rate of steam and helium is not constant in theNo. FEs Power/FE (kW/FE) Total power (MW)
240 2 0.5
121 40 4.7
121 40 4.7
121 40 4.7
Fig. 3 e Test scenario timeline for the Experiments on Spent Fuel Pool project. Phase1: steam release from boiling in the
spent fuel pool. Phase I of the test lasts until the wall temperature reaches 85C in the upper part of Vessel 1. Phase2: steam
release due to boiling along with helium release to simulate hydrogen originating from zircalloy cladding and water
oxidation reaction.
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distorted in the present experiments. The test scenario is
represented in Fig. 3.2.3. Test parameters
Several variables have an effect on the hydrogen concentra-
tion distribution into the SFP building. Among these, the
location of the vent/leak is certainly a key parameter because
it affects the overall gas mixture transport, e.g., for inter-
compartment SFP buildings, hydrogen could be trapped in
hidden volumes located away from themain flow pattern. The
steamehydrogen release rate and the initial steameair
building composition also play a role. The mixture composi-
tion affects the overall buoyancy into the building and there-
fore the phenomena of transport and mixing. Moreover, the
mixture composition and the wall temperature have an effect
on the condensation. Fig. 4 shows a PANDA three-dimensional
view with the indication of vent locations. Table 2 shows the
main test parameters.
In the PANDA tests, venting takes place from the top of
Vessel 1 (LP2; to simulate a case when it would be vented
directly from the SFP room), or from Vessel 2 (LP1; to simulate
a case when it would be vented to the atmosphere of an
adjacent building).Fig. 4 e PANDA test configuration for the Experiments on Spen
represented but were activated separately.3. PANDA facility
3.1. Test facility configuration
The PANDA facility is a large scale, multi-compartmental
thermal hydraulic facility suited for investigations related to
the safety of current and advanced light water reactors [8].
The containment compartments and the reactor pressure
vessel are simulated in the PANDA facility by six cylindrical
pressure vessels. Various auxiliary systems are also available
to maintain and control the necessary initial and boundary
conditions during a test. The maximum operating conditions
of the facility are 10 bar at 200C
In the ESFP project, the experiments were carried out in a
large double compartment with 183.3 m3 total volume con-
sisting of two identical vessels (Vessel 1 and Vessel 2) with a
height of 8 m and a diameter of 4 m each. Vessel 1 and 2 are
connected by a large IP with a diameter of 1 m. To minimize
heat loss, the entire facility is thermally insulated with a 20-
cm thick rock-wool mat. The reactor pressure vessel was
used as a steam source to inject superheated steam into
Vessel 1 through a sparger located 1,800 mm from the bottom
of Vessel 1 to simulate the diffuse flow which would be
created by the SFP boiling (Fig. 5). A helium (substituting
hydrogen for the purpose of the experiment) supply systemt Fuel Pool. Vent Line Positions (LPs) [LP1 and LP2] are both
Table 2 e Nominal initial and boundary conditions.
Test parameter Phase PB1 PB2 PB3 PB4
Vent position Vessel 2 (LP1) Vessel 2 (LP1) Vessel 1 (LP2) Vessel 1 (LP2)
Initial pressure (bar) 0 1 1 1 1
Initial fluid temperature (C) 0 20 60 20 60
Initial wall temperature (C) 0 20 60 20 60
Initial air concentration (vol%) 0 100 100 100 100
Initial steam concentration (vol%) 0 0 0 0 0
Water pool volume (m3) 0 2 2 2 2
Water pool temperature (C) 0 85 85 85 85
Steam injection flow rate (g/sec) 1 60 60 60 60
Injection temperature (C) 1 110 110 110 110
Final wall temperature (C), upper Vessel 1 1 85 85 85 85
Duration of relaxation phase (sec) 600 600 600 600
Helium injection flow rate (g/sec) 2 2 2 2 2
Steam injection flow rate (g/sec) 2 60 60 60 60
Injection temperature (C) 2 110 110 110 110
Duration of Phase 2 (sec) 2 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,200
LP,Line Position.
Fig. 5 e Computer-aided design and picture of a steam sparger used in the Experiments on Spent Fuel Pool project in the
PANDA facility.
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inject helium into Vessel 1 through the same sparger used for
the injection of steam.
Before the beginning of the test, a 2-m3 water pool was
created to simulate the remainingwater of the SFP, withwater
heated up to 85C and directly injected into the bottom of
Vessel 1.
Two different vent configurations were used in the project:
- The vent LP1 installed in Vessel 2 down to the mid-level of
the IP at 3,800 mm from the bottom of Vessel 2.
- The vent LP2 used in Vessel 1 located at the top of Vessel 1
at 7,840 mm from the bottom of Vessel 1.3.2. Instrumentation
The two main quantities measured in the PANDA Vessels 1
and 2 during the tests are: (1) temperature; and (2) concen-
tration. Besides these main quantities, the data acquisition
allows for the measurement of absolute and differential
pressures and injection flow rates. The measurement sensorsare implemented in all the facility compartments, in the sys-
tem lines, and in the auxiliary systems.
For the temperature measurements around 380 K-type
thermocouples were used for measuring fluid, along with in-
side and outside wall temperatures of Vessel 1, Vessel 2, and
the IP. The high spatial resolution of the thermocouples is well
suited for the envisaged code validation purposes.
The gas concentration wasmeasured in the PANDA facility
bymeans of twomass spectrometers. Up to 118 sampling lines
can be connected to the two mass spectrometers. The system
can measure any gas concentration and composition. The
number of sampling lines used for measurements varied in
each test and during the test evolution. Different scanning
sequences were programmed to monitor facility pre-
conditioning, initial test conditions, and test evolution. A
thermocouple was placed a few millimeters apart from each
sampling line tip so that gas concentration and temperature
measurements were available at almost the same spatial
location. For steam/air/helium mixtures, an absolute error on
the measured molar fraction of ±1.5% was assessed.
The steam injections were measured with vortex flow
meters with an accuracy of 1.1%, whereas the helium
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with an accuracy of 1%.4. Results and discussion
Results of test PB1 and PB3 are discussed in detail in this
section, highlighting the effect of the vent location in the
overall flow pattern in the facility. Test PB2 and PB4 conducted
with similar configurations butwith higher initial wall and gas
temperatures (60C vs. 20C for the latest) are discussed
separately further on.
4.1. Overall pressure evolution
The pressure evolution recorded during test PB1 showed a
similar behavior to PB3 (Fig. 6A).
In Phase 1, as steam alone is injected, a jump in pressure is
observed to reach a level of 1.05 bar. During the following
relaxation phase the pressure drops to a level lower than the
initial atmospheric pressure underlining a slight under pres-
sure that leads to air ingress in the facility. The in-flow of a
colder gas mixture was actually observed with the vent tem-
perature measurement (Fig. 6B). At the initiation of Phase 2, a
second jump is observed. No stable level is reached, however,
which implies that due to the pressure drop in the venting
line, the injected gas flow rate cannot be fully vented.
Although test PB2 and PB4 started at a higher wall tempera-
ture leading to a shorter Phase 1, the pressure evolution in
Phase 2 follows the trend of the corresponding test, PB1 and
PB3, respectively.
4.2. Phase 1: Steam injection
After the start of the steam injection, the gas and wall tem-
perature start to increase due to the steam condensation on
the colder steel wall. Although no measurements of the gas
concentration were possible in this phase due to the strong
condensation in the vessel, the steam concentration in the
vessel could be infered from the temperature measurement.
Under the assumption of saturated conditions characterized
by strong bulk and wall condensation, the measured0 4,000 8,000 12,000
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Fig. 6 e Vessel pressure evolution and vent gas temperaturtemperature represents quite precisely the saturation tem-
perature. The temperature evolution is represented by means
of a contour map obtained from a densely instrumented
cross-section of the facility. Each black cross represents an
effective thermocouple and the temperatures were interpo-
lated linearly between the neighboring sensors. Resulting
plots are presented in Fig. 7.
Before starting the steam injection (Fig. 7A) the presence of
the pool leads to a slightly higher temperature in Vessel 1 (left)
compared with Vessel 2 (right). After the start of the steam
injection Vessel 1 heats up rapidly and an intercompartment
flow is established with warmer steam-rich (therefore lighter)
gasmixture flowing fromVessel 1 to the upper part of Vessel 2
through the top of the IP and a colder gasmixture flowing back
from Vessel 2 to the bottom of Vessel 1 through the bottom of
the IP. This flow configuration remains during the entire Phase
1. At the end of Phase 1 when the wall temperature reaches
85C, a gas composition of 58/42%volume steam/airmixture is
inferred.4.3. Relaxation phase: No injection
The intercompartment flow seems to stop and a strong tem-
perature stratification is observed (Fig. 7D). The top of Vessel 1
remains close to 85C, while the bottom of Vessel 2 remains at
its initial temperature of 20C. In between, the bottom part of
Vessel 1 and the top part of Vessel 2 seem to equilibrate.
During this phase the mass concentration systemwas started
to record the gas concentration evolution in a less condensing
environment.4.4. Phase 2: Steam/helium injection
As soon as steam and helium are injected in Phase 2, the
intercompartment flow pattern observed in Phase 1 is recov-
ered (Fig. 7E). Note that the temperature scale was reduced to
underline the warmer plume escaping from the top of the IP
into Vessel 2, similarly to what was observed in Phase 1. Later
on, the flow through the IP stops (Fig. 7F). The plume described
previously does not appear anymore on the contour map and
a relatively important cool down of the gas located in thet
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Fig. 7 e Selected temperature contour plots for test PB1. (A) t¼¡2 s. (B) t¼ 2,238 s. (C) t¼ 6,720 s. (D) t¼ 7,310 s. (E) t¼ 10,000
s. (F) t ¼ 14,000 s. ESFP, Experimental Spent Fuel Pool.
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condensation process on the wall of the upper part of vessel 2
has stopped such that the heat loss of the facility becomes
dominant in the temperature control of the wall. The conse-
quences of such a flow interruption are clarified at the view of
the concentration measurements. Air and helium concentra-
tion evolution are presented for both vessels for test PB1 and
PB2 in Figs. 8e11In Vessel 1 (Figs. 8 and 9) full mixing of the gas space occurs
within 2,000 seconds in Phase 2. After t¼ 10,000 seconds for
PB1 and PB3, the helium and air concentration are homoge-
neous from the top of the facility(A level) to the bottom (S and
T level).
After t¼ 12,000 seconds the air is fully removed from
Vessel 1 in PB1, while it takes an additional 2,000 seconds for
the test PB3. This can be explained by a higher concentration
ATD1_1
T
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D
S
Vessel 1 Time (s) Time (s)
A
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H
8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000
Fig. 8 e Helium and air concentration evolution in Vessel 1 for test PB1.
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Fig. 9 e Helium and air concentration evolution in Vessel 1 for test PB3.
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As discussed previsously in the temperature contour maps,
the mixture of the upper Vessel 2 flows back to Vessel 1
through the bottom of the IP. The air concentration measured
at TD1_5 (bottom IP) illustrates this phenomenom in Figs. 8
and 9, which follows the air concentration level measured at
Level A andD in Vessel 2 (Figs. 10 and 11). For a venting locatedTime (s)
8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 8
A
(–
) (–
)
H
Fig. 10 e Helium and air concentrationin the same vessel than the injection, air removal is less effi-
cient as it is connected to an adjacent vessel whose air content
is reduced at a much slower rate.
For test PB1 (Fig. 8) the helium concentration increases
above 15% at t¼ 10,000 seconds and then reduces to 14%,
which corresponds to the helium molar fraction at the injec-
tion line. For test PB3 (Fig. 9) a similar trend is observed butA
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Fig. 11 e Helium and air concentration evolution in Vessel 2 for test PB3.
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at TD1_5 sensor shows a constant transport of mixture with a
higher helium content (~20%volume) from Vessel 2 after
t¼ 10,000 seconds.
Related to the intercompartment transport it is worth
noting that at t¼ 12,000 seconds the gas concentration
measured at the TD1_5 sensormatches the one of the Vessel 1
bulk. At that point we identified that the intercompartment
flow has either stopped or drastically reduced, with a change
in direction. The consequence of the change in flow pattern is
clearly underlined by the helium concentration measured in
Vessel 2. While the helium concentration increases regularly
and homogenously in the upper part of Vessel 2 (A and D level)
for test PB3 (Fig. 11) a strong helium stratification appears for
test PB1 (Fig. 10). The stratification build up starts at the same
time that the intercompartment flow stops at t¼ 12,000 sec-
onds. Helium concentration up to ~30%volume are measured
at the top of Vessel 2.
Toobtain insight into theprocess that triggers suchachange
in flow, a closer look at the density evolution is required. Den-
sity of the gas mixture was calculated considering the
measured temperature, gas concentration, and pressure mea-
surementsobtained at a specific location. Results are presented
in Fig. 12A for test PB1 and Fig. 12B for test PB3.
In the early Phase 2, the densities measured in the upper
part of Vessel 1 are much lower than in the rest of the facility.
In both tests the density in the lower part of Vessel 2, Level N8,000 12,000
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As wemove upward in Vessel 2, a strong change of density
is observed. There are only 660 mm of elevation difference
between Level M andN in Vessel 2, with level M slightly higher
that the bottom of the IP. The density difference between the
two levels increases during Phase 2; at the end the density of
theM level represents only half of the density of theN Level. In
the meantime, the density difference between the M level,
TD1_5, and Vessel 1 reduces to such an extent at around
t¼ 11,000 seconds, there is not enough buoyancy forces to
promote intercompartment flow for test PB1. In such a situa-
tion, stagnant gas present in Vessel 2 cools down under the
effect of the facility heat loss, leading to bulk condensation
and an increase in helium content. This density equilibrium
was not reached in the case of test PB3 within the time of the
experiment. In this latter case, the presence of the vent in
Vessel 1 does not promote enough transport in Vessel 2 to
equilibrate the density and stop the natural circulation loop
between the compartments.
Considering the density of the injectedmixture depicted by
D1X in Fig. 12, one also observes that the buoyancy of the
injected gas mixture with respect to the bulk of Vessel 1 de-
creases with time. This also reduces the mixing in Vessel 1
such that the gas mixture becomes “stagnant” at the top of
Vessel 1 itself leading to an increase of helium concentration
at Level A (Fig. 8A) following the same process observed inD
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vent located at the top of Vessel 1.
4.5. Effect of vent location
In summary, the vent location has an effect on the distribu-
tion and stratification of helium. In case of venting from the
adjacent Vessel 2 (tests PB1 and PB2)dmeaning from another
connected vented building or roomdmixing ensues in Vessel
1 and a stronger convection between the Vessels is initiated.
With time, depletion of air and an increase in helium con-
centration reduces the buoyancy force at the injection
(simulating the top of the pool) to such an extent that stagnant
gas mixture forms locally with a strong increase in helium
concentration.
In case of venting directly from the top of Vessel 1 (tests
PB3 and PB4)dmeaning directly from the SFP building into the
environmentda strong mixing is maintained within Vessel 1
and a natural circulation loop forms with the adjacent Vessel
2, simulating other potentially connected unvented rooms.
Except for a space located below the connection of the two
vessels the entire gas space is well mixed.
4.6. Effect of initial wall temperature
The main outcome of the increase of the initial wall temper-
ature relied on the higher re-evaporation potential in the
lower part of Vessel 2. Indeed, during the injection of steam
and steam/helium, condensation occurs leading to an in-
crease of the wall temperature. The condensate flows down
the wall towards the region of low steam contentdthe lower
part of Vessel 2 for instancedwhere it re-evaporates. This was
observed with the measured higher steam concentration at
the bottom of Vessel 2 in PB2 and PB4 (~20%volume; Fig. 13)
compared with PB1 and PB3 (~2%volume; Figs. 10 and 11).
Note that the helium concentration evolution measured in
test PB2 is similar to PB1 but with a lower helium content.
4.7. Flammability issue
In an attempt to evaluate the potential for deflagration or
detonation in the SFP building, the concentrations have been
plotted in a ternary diagram similar to the one used by ShapiroTime (s)
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A
(–
) (
–)
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Fig. 13 e Helium and air concentrationand Moffette [9], to assess the flammability risk of hydrogen
(Fig. 14). It is clear that helium does not itself present any risk
of flammability, but conceptually, one can assess the flam-
mability risk by assuming that helium would represent the
hydrogen concentration in a real accident. The results are
plotted for both Vessel 1 and 2 for test PB1 and PB3 in Figs 14A
and 14B, respectively.
In Vessel 1, for both tests PB1 and PB3, the fast depletion
of air in a well-mixed environment leads to low risk of
flammability with most of the sensors away from the
deflagration zone. The only risk would concern the sensor
location, with a slightly higher air content such as T level or
TD1_5 in the IP.
In Vessel 2, for both tests PB1 and PB3, three cases are
encountered. First, in the lower part of Vessel 2 (Level N and T)
the helium content is so low that the flammable limits are not
reached. Secondly, in the upper part of Vessel 2 the air content
is so low at the end of Phase 2 that the flammable limit is not
reached. In the latter case, however, an incursion within the
flammable zone occurs during the transient. Thirdly, the in-
termediate region where both helium and air are present
substantially, presents a risk real and permanent.
Another consideration related to the flammability con-
cerns the potential of the mixture to become flammable while
being vented or transported in adjacent rooms. Indeed many
of the conditions encountered during the transient present
the characteristic to enter the deflagration zone, or even the
detonation zone if steam came to fully condense during a
hypothetical venting process. This is represented by the or-
ange hatched zone in Fig. 14A. It appears safer to vent the
mixture at the end of the transient when the dry gas volu-
metric ratio hydrogen (helium in our case) to air is safe to
handle. Note that in case of venting fromVessel 1, test PB3, the
final gas composition in the upper part of Vessel 2 might not
allow for any venting at all.5. Conclusion
As part of ESFP project, a series of four tests have been
conducted in the PANDA facility to simulate a steam/
hydrogen release scenario similar to what one would expect
in case of a severe accident involving the SFP. The scenarioA
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Fig. 14 e Representation of concentration evolution in ternary diagrams for Vessels 1 and 2 of tesst PB1 and PB3. The
flammability limits are for hydrogen/air/steam mixture only. (A) Test PB1. (B) Test PB3.
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generation pressurized water reactor (400 MW) SFP design
was identified and scaled to the PANDA facility. The effect of
vent location and wall temperature on the overall gas mix-
ing and distribution was studied. Results show that while
the SFP building would mainly be inerted by the presence
of a high concentration of steam, the volume located
below the level of the pool in adjacent rooms would main-
tain a high air content. The interface of the two-gas mixture
presents the highest risk of flammability. Additionally, it
was observed that the stagnant gas mixture could appear
due to the reduction of the buoyancy of the injected flow,
leading locally to a high hydrogen concentration while
steam condenses. Overall, the experiments provide relevant
information for the potentially hazardous gas distribution
formed in the SFP building and hints on accident manage-
ment and on eventual retrofitting measures to be imple-
mented in the SFP building. Finally, the data are available
for code validation.Conflicts of interest
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